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Abstract
We propose that auction duration and auction
description are two important auction design
parameters that could serve as screening mechanisms
for quality in online auctions. Using data from an online
labor matching platform that connects buyers with IT
service vendors, we examine the effects of auction
duration and auction descriptions on auction outcomes
(i.e., number of bids, bidder quality, bidding price) and
project outcomes (i.e., project being contracted and
being completed). Our empirical analyses show that, in
buyer-determined reverse auctions of online labor
matching, auctions with a longer duration and a longer
description attract more bids, but they also attract more
low quality bidders with less experience and lower
completion rate, and hence result in a lower probability
of successful contracting and completion of software
service projects. Our research provides empirical
evidence highlighting the strategic roles of auction
design parameters like auction duration and
descriptions as a potential screening mechanism for
online labor matching platforms.

1. Introduction
Advanced information and communications
technologies have enabled global online labor matching
that facilitates the pairing of buyers with service
providers across the globe with low search and
transaction costs. These markets usually operate in the
form of reverse auctions, where buyers post “Call for
Bids” (CFB) and service providers submit bids to
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compete for contracts and offer services. Online labor
matching platforms have been expanding at an
astounding pace since its inception. The Bureau of
Labor Statistics estimates that more than 30 million
people now work as independent professionals in the US
alone. Due to their significant impact on economy,
online labor matching platforms have also drawn much
attention in the academic literature [1-6]. Most of the
extant literature focuses on the rules governing the
selection of winning providers [1, 4, 7]. While the
selection of winning bid is important, it is only half the
story, both because how bidders are attracted to the
auctions (i.e., auction outcome) reveals important
implications for who the buyers could contract and
because whether a project is successfully carried out
(i.e., project outcome) is very important from the
buyers’ perspective. As noted in the extant literature,
different auction designs could significantly alter the
strategic behavior of bidders [3]. Surprisingly, there are
very few empirical papers that examine the role of
auction design parameters in affecting auction outcomes
and project outcomes. This paper seeks to provide a new
lens of screening to understand the role of two auction
design factors: auction duration and auction description.
Among different auction design parameters of online
labor matching platforms, prior research has squarely
focused on bid visibility [3]. Similar to other auction
settings, auctions in online labor matching platforms
allow buyers to vary multiple design parameters (e.g.,
project category, project budget, auction duration,
auction description), among which project category is
exogenous (e.g., software development, web design,
etc.). Although buyers also set the project budget, it is
largely determined by the complexity of the project.

Page 3411

Buyers have the most degree of freedom in setting
auction duration and providing auction descriptions.
Therefore, auction duration and descriptions are the key
design parameters when launching an auction by a
buyer. Intuitively, one would expect longer auctions and
more detailed auction descriptions to benefit the buyers,
as they can help attract more bidders and reduce project
uncertainty for the bidders. Therefore, auctions with
longer duration and more detailed descriptions are
presumed to produce better auction outcomes and
project outcomes1. However, this is yet to be empirically
corroborated. Especially, the relationship with respect to
project outcomes has not been studied much but are
arguably the most important to buyers.
Therefore, our first research question is: does longer
auction duration lead to better or worse auction
outcomes and project outcomes for online labor
matching platforms?
Auction duration is an essential aspect of online
auction design. Unlike traditional English auctions held
in auction houses where bidders gather in a room to bid
for a product within a few minutes, online auctions
usually last for days, sometimes even months. Duration
of the auction is generally a decision of the buyer, and it
may have a significant impact on the bidders’ decision
to enter the auction. Haruvy and Leszczyc [8] have
provided a comprehensive review of the literature that
looks at auction duration’s impact. In highlighting
important results related to auction duration from the
literature, we summarize the key findings in Table 1. As
can be seen, the context of most of these studies is
ordinary forward auction, in which price is the outcome
variable and tends to go up as the auction continues. Our
research, instead, focuses on reverse auction in the
context of online labor matching market where price
tends to go down when bidders compete with each other
in order to win the bid. The conventional view is that
longer auctions would perform better, as they attract
more bidders and bids, which in turn would result in
better outcomes. On the other hand, an opposing and
unconventional view is that while longer duration
attracts more bids, it may drive away impatient bidders
or bidders who can afford to forego the opportunity by
taking on other shorter-duration auctions, therefore
inadvertently resulting in adverse selection and
negatively impacting project outcomes. Therefore,
while seemingly intuitive, the effect of auction duration
on project outcomes is not as straightforward and clearcut as one might think and warrants an in-depth
empirical investigation.
1

Auction outcomes include number of bids attained and overall bidder
quality in an auction, while project outcomes refer to whether a service
provider is awarded the contract and whether the project is

Table 1. Related Studies on Auction Duration
Authors
(Year)
Cox [9]

Context and
Method
Forward auction
(Observational)

Key insights

Ariely and
Simonson [10]

Forward auction
(Observational)

Bapna et al.
[11]

eBay, forward
auctions
(Observational)
Reverse auctions
(Observational)

Auction duration
negatively affects
final price.
Longer auction
negatively affects
price dynamics.
Auction duration
has no effect on
buyer surplus.
On eBay, longer
duration leads to
more bids and a
higher price; no
effect is found at
the local site.
Longer auction
leads to higher
bid prices

Mithas et al.
[12]
Haruvy and
Leszczyc [8]

Bapna et al.
[12]

eBay and a local
auction site,
forward auctions
(Experiments)
Overlapping auctions
(Observational)

Longer auctions
attract more bids.

Auction description, on the other hand, has not been
studied as much. An intuitive view is that detailed
descriptions reduce bidder uncertainty as longer
descriptions help bidders better understand project
requirements, and hence they can help achieve better
outcomes. This also implies that projects should have
fairly detailed descriptions. However, anecdotal
observations suggest that there is huge variation in
auction descriptions even for the same type of projects
(e.g., build a website). This variation allows us to study
and understand the effect of auction descriptions on
auction outcomes. Our second research question is: does
longer auction description in an auction lead to better
or worse auction and project outcomes for online labor
matching platforms? Given that project contracts and
the actual details are only provided after a winning
bidder has been chosen, auction descriptions may not be
as essential as one assumes in the bidder’s decision to
submit a bid or the buyer’s selection of the eventual
service provider. By the same token, capable bidders
may be less dependent on description details, but novice
bidders would be more receptive to the requirements of
projects. If this is indeed the case, then auction
descriptions may serve (unknowingly) as a screening
mechanism for bidder quality. In essence, since longer
auction descriptions provide more details and hence
successfully completed, conditionally on a service provider being
selected.
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reduces bidder’s uncertainty about the project, one
would presume that longer auction descriptions lead to
greater performance. However, more experienced and
capable bidders may be less sensitive to such project
uncertainty than less experienced and capable bidders,
so longer auction descriptions may in fact attract a larger
proportion of low quality bidders, thus hurting
performance. We are interested in knowing whether
detailed project information provided early at the
beginning of the auction helps or hurts auction outcomes
and project outcomes.
In summary, we argue that the true effects of auction
duration and auction description go beyond simply
attracting more bids, as they can potentially act as
screening mechanisms for bidder quality that affect the
composition of bidders attained in an auction and
consequently the outcomes of the project. This paper
aims to provide a comprehensive examination linking
auction design to auction outcomes (i.e., number of bids,
bidder quality, bidding price) and consequently to
project outcomes (i.e., project being contracted and
being completed).
Based on a unique dataset from an online labor
matching platform, we empirically examine several
aspects of bidder entry and auction outcomes to consider
the following factors: number of bids, bidder quality,
bidding price, whether a project reaches a contract, and
project final completion (conditional on contract). Our
empirical analyses show that, in buyer-determined
reverse auctions of online labor matching, auctions with
longer duration and longer description indeed attract
more bids but they also attract more low quality bidders
with less experience and lower prior completion rate,
and in turn lead to a lower probability of successful
completion of software service projects. Our research
provides empirical evidence regarding the strategic
roles of auction duration and auction description as a
potential screening mechanism for quality on online
labor matching platforms. Shorter duration and shorter
description actually help screen out less experienced and
less capable bidders, and in turn result in higher contract
probability and completion rate. This finding helps
explain why many online labor matching platforms have
now placed a duration limit on their auctions.

2. Study Context
The context of our study is online labor matching
platforms. Besides the rich data this context provides us,
online labor matching platform is economically
important in its own right. As cited by Hong et al. [3],
both Elance and Freelancer host millions of registered

services providers and have billions of dollars’ worth of
transactions, boasting a “Freelancer Economy” and
becoming an exemplar for the emerging gig economy.
Our empirical data is obtained from the proprietary
database of a large online labor matching platform,
which employs the mechanism of buyer-determined
reverse auction [1, 3, 5, 6, 13]. Buyers initiate “call for
bids” by posting projects in the marketplace. To post a
project, a buyer needs to specify auction parameters
such as auction duration and project-related information
such as project category, description, and budget.

Figure 1. Screenshot of One Project on the
2
Marketplace
Figure 1 shows an example of call for bids by a
project to build a website. There is no fee for posting
auctions with different auction durations, and the buyer
could end the auction early at any time (i.e., the buyer
does not need to wait until the full auction duration
elapses). After a project is posted to the marketplace
website, the bidders (i.e., vendors or service providers)
start bidding on the project. The buyer could close the
auction with or without selecting a bidder to contract
with. The auction automatically closes for bidding after
the auction duration expires (e.g., 7 days). Specifically,
we are interested in two main parameters:

2

Please note that the marketplace has changed its reputation system
after our observational period from a 1-10 scale system to a 1-5 scale
system, in October 2010.

Page 3413

Auction Duration: To post a project, the buyer needs
to specify the duration of the auction in days, but the
buyer could terminate the auction anytime during the
auction duration and award the contract to a particular
vendor. However, since bidders have no idea whether a
buyer will end an auction early or not, the preset auction
duration would influence bidders’ behaviors when they
submit their bids.
Auction Description: To post a project, the buyer
needs to provide a description of the project. The
description does not need to be a full contract but instead
is meant to inform potential bidders of the project
requirements to some extent. The buyer could specify
contract details of the project after selecting a bidder.

3. Literature Review
3.1. Reverse Auction Design
Reverse auctions mean those auction processes
starting with the buyers’ announcement regarding the
requirement and auction parameters. Then the bidders
bid for the contract or product [12, 14]. Nowadays,
reverse auctions are prevalent in online labor markets
[3], B2B procurements [12], and C2C commerce [15].
Given the burgeoning use of online reverse auctions
in various online platforms, very little empirical
research explores the reverse auction design strategy,
specifically the auction design regarding information
revelation and duration. With regard to information
revelation, Kannan [16] found that whether the
Complete Information Setting (CIS) leads to a higher
buyer surplus than Incomplete Information Setting (IIS)
or not is still an inconclusive question. However, his
study merely focuses on the competition information
revelation instead of the task requirement or demand
information. In terms of auction duration, the results are
also mixed and inconclusive. Lucking-Reiley [15]
suggested that longer auction duration might lead to a
higher transaction price while Miltas and Jones [12]
found that auction duration doesn’t influence buyer
surplus. Haruvy and Leszczyc [8], instead, found that
long auction duration leads to a lower auction price in
local websites. However, these studies mainly explore
the auction outcome based on the single-attribute (price)
and ignore the bidders’ quality and other attributes.
As Choudhury, Hartzel, and Konsynski [8] pointed out,
it is quality instead of price that plays the important role
in choosing providers of Inventory Locator Service
(ILS) in the aircraft parts industry and hence the quality
of bidders may be of more interest to buyers. In this
paper, we focus on investigating how two non-price
auction design parameters (i.e., auction duration and
auction description) may influence the auction
outcomes (e.g., the number of bids, the bidders’ quality,
etc.) through the varied information amount and waiting

time. Moreover, instead of examining the auction
performance in terms of price, we explore how the
buyers can provide project information and set auction
duration appropriately to attract more bidders,
especially high-quality bidders, to improve auction
outcomes and project outcomes.

3.2. Information, Duration and Behavior
Decisions
Based on the Behavior Decision Making theory [17],
information representation influences the uncertainty
assessment process in one or more phases including the
followings: 1) information acquisition; 2) uncertainty
evaluation; 3) action and implement choices; and 4)
learning or feedback. In the context of online labor
matching, information revelation parameters influence
bidders’ information advantage and uncertainty
assessment. Meanwhile, auction duration influences
bidders’ opportunity cost of bidding actions and
learning behavior.
In particular, the information asymmetry between
bidders and buyers is partially dependent on the task
description design. According to the auction theory,
when bidders are faced with the auction decision, they
need to cope with three types of information, namely,
private information, public information and uncertainty
[18], as shown in Table 2. The length or completeness
of task description increases the public information and
lowers the uncertainty generally. As such, longer
description tends to attract more bids. In addition, the
task description influences the importance of bidderspecific private information and cost uncertainty, which
influence the competitive advantage of high-capability
bidders.
Table 2. Types of Information Cues in Auction
Decisions
Subcategory
Private
information

Characteristics
information known to
one bidder but not the
others

Public
information

information known to all
bidders

Description
Private
information
regarding task
content and
difficulties
Project
description,
project budgets,
and the
employers’
reputation, etc.
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Project cost
uncertainty

Information which is
common or specific
across all the bidders but
known to no bidder

Uncertainties
regarding the
projects’ value to
the employers, the
variation of the
production cost
(Schwartz and
Moon 2000), and
the possibility that
a catastrophic
event may occur
before the project
is completed.

In addition, auction duration has an impact on not
only bidders’ opportunity costs related to the bid
decision but also their learning processes. Even though
it has been found that auction duration enhances the
probability of attracting more bidders at different time
zones [12], it may also increase the waiting time and
discourage some bidders’ entry decision. Further, the
longer duration might have different impacts on highcapability and lower-capability bidders [11].

4. Hypotheses development
According to the Behavior Decision Making theory,
auction description may influence a provider’s bid
decision during the stages of information acquisition
and uncertainty evaluation, while auction duration may
be more related to the action and implementation of
choices as well as the learning and feedback processes.
Moreover, both auction description and auction duration
may have a heterogeneous effect on bidders depending
on their capability and experience.

4.1. Auction Description and Bid Decision
We use the following setup to explicate and explore
how auction description affects bidder entry and shifts
bidder quality distribution. The buyer could describe the
project in more or less detail when the buyer posts an
auction. Detailed auction description provides more
public information for all the bidders to help them to
understand the project requirements and construct their
expectations about the production difficulties.
Furthermore, longer auction description indicates that
the employer has a clearer idea about the project
requirements and may be able to provide more useful
and specific instructions about the project
implementation. The pre-contract auction description
hence can alleviate bidders’ uncertainty about the
project’s cost and valuation. Therefore, longer auction
description lowers the information asymmetry between
the employer and the bidders regarding the task,
decreases the general uncertainty, and attracts more
bidders.

As an illustration of the potential effects of auction
descriptions, consider two types of bidders: low quality
and high quality. Low quality bidders are characterized
by low project experience and/or low technical
capability; vice versa for high quality bidders. On the
other hand, high quality bidders have more private
information because of their project experience and
technical capability (e.g., project requirements
analysis). So they are better at inferring a project’s value
than less experienced bidders [19]. Since high quality
bidders are more capable of implementing the project
and avoiding the risks during the production process,
they tend to have less cost uncertainty than low quality
bidders. Especially when the description is short, highcapability bidders are more competent to cope with the
uncertainty and make a better bid decision. Therefore,
shorter auction description could potentially (either
intentionally or unintentionally) help screen out less
experienced and capable bidders. In other words,
although longer auction description might lead to more
bids, it likely ends up attracting more inexperienced
bidders. Therefore, we propose:
H1a: Longer auction description leads to more bids
in total.
H1b: Longer auction description leads to lower
average bidder quality (in terms of seller win rate and
seller success rate).

4.2. Auction Duration and Bid Decision
Apart from auction description, auction duration
may also have an impact on auction outcomes (i.e.,
number of bids and bidder quality). First, it is intuitive
to assume that an auction with longer duration should
result in more bids because longer auction would be
exposed to more service providers, everything else
being equal. Longer duration increases the probability
of the project being discovered and considered when
vendors browse through the directory of open auctions
for projects on the website. Further, an interesting
follow-up question is to explore how auction duration
affects bidder quality. For one thing, auction duration
influences bidders' actions or their implementation of
choices because of the opportunity costs involved in the
waiting stage. Especially for high-quality bidders, they
tend to have high reservation wage and high opportunity
costs, which discourages them from spending too much
time waiting for the buyers’ pending choices. For
another thing, high-quality contractors, compared to
low-quality contractors, tend to have stronger market
power and be less susceptible to the price dynamics
through the whole auction duration [11]. Therefore,
low-quality contractors are more likely to bid for
auctions with longer duration so that they could have
enough time to learn from previous bids and to infer the
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Table 3. Definitions and Measures of
Key Variables
Auction Design Variables
Auction Duration:
Number of days the auction is
active
Auction Description:
Number of words in the auction
description
Auction Outcome Variables
Number of Bids:
Total number of bids received by
the auction
Average Bidder Win
Average of a bidder’s auction
Rate:
winning rate
Average Bidder Success
Average of a bidder’s awarded
Rate:
project success rate
Control Variables

Min

Max

0.602

Std.
Dev.
0.489

Contracted

0.000

1.000

Completed

0.426

0.494

0.000

1.000

Auction
Duration
Auction
description
Project Budget

10.273

15.597

1.000

60.000

101.550

131.378

1.000

7944.000

339.955

192.058

250.000

750.000

Number of
Bids
Average Bid
Price
Avg(bidder
win rate)
Avg(bidder
success rate)

13.367

14.670

1.000

89.000

164.310

168.366

29.000

1515.625

0.076

0.093

0.000

1.000

0.417

0.290

0.000

1.000

.8

Mean

.6

We obtained our data from the proprietary database
of one large online labor matching platform, which
connects buyers with IT service providers, from August
2008 to April 2010. This unique data set allows us to
observe every aspect of the project, bidders, auction
outcomes and project outcomes free of error. In our
observational period, we have a random sample of
69,323 projects, which attracted 1084,884 bids. Out of
the 69,323 projects, 41,822 reached a contract. We
focus on the most common, free to post open-bid
projects, which account for more than 80% of all the
projects. Special projects such as featured projects, trial
projects and long term projects are not included in this
data set. Focusing on the most common form of auctions
allows us to have a better estimate of the effects of
auction duration and auction description without being
influenced by other confounding factors. Table 3
defines our variables and the corresponding measures,
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of key
variables.

Table 4. Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Percentage of bids
.4

5.1. Data

Buyer-specified project budget
Year-month dummies
Project category dummies

.2

5. Empirical Methodology

Project Budget:
Time:
Project Category:

0

project value and uncertainty. Additionally, when the
buyer posts an auction with a longer duration (regardless
intentionally or unintentionally), bidders may interpret
this as a signal that the buyer is trying to minimize
contractor surplus by encouraging the competition
among contractors. This signal in turn may drive away
high-quality contractors as they are more likely to find
another project whose buyer is more munificent and
discreet and they are more likely to earn a higher
surplus. Therefore, we propose:
H2a: Longer auction duration leads to more bids in
total.
H2b: Longer auction duration leads to lower
average bidder quality (in terms of seller win rate and
seller success rate).

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

day

Figure 2. The Distribution of Bids During the
Auction Duration
Notes: In the X axis, the bar within the interval between 0 and 1
means the number of bids submitted at the same day when the project
was posted. The second bar represents the number of bids submitted
when the number of bids submitted at the first day after the project
was posted. The percentage of bids submitted from the project
submission time to the first day occupies 81.8% of total bids.

5.2. Model-free Evidence
Before we estimate the effects of auction duration
and auction description on auction outcomes and project
outcomes using econometric methods, we provide some
model-free evidence based on visualization of the
distributions and non-parametric tests. Figure 2 shows
the distribution of bids during the auction duration. We
also present the overlaid histograms in Figure 3 to
exhibit the differences in the distributions of both bidder
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ratings and bidder experience with regard to different
auction durations and different auction descriptions. For
auction duration, 5 days and 30 days are shown, and for
auction descriptions, long description (> average length)
versus short description (< average length) are shown.

Figure 3. Overlaid Histograms
We also run non-parametric tests for distributional
inequality. Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
determine whether the two independent samples have
been drawn from the same populations with the same
distribution or from populations with different
distributions. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests shows that the
bidder experience distributions are significantly
different for auctions with different auction duration and
descriptions (p<0.001).

6. Empirical Models
6.1. Project-level Empirical Analysis
We follow extant studies [3] that examined auctions
in online labor matching markets to set up the empirical
model. Equation (1) outlines our empirical model for
estimating the effects of auction format on the number
of bids received in an auction. This empirical model
includes the main variables “Auction Duration” and
“Auction Description”, buyer fixed effects 𝛿" , project
category fixed effects 𝜆$ , time fixed effects 𝜓& , as well
as auction/project-level control variables, such as
project budge. In Equation (1), parameter i is used to
index projects, j is used to index project categories, q is
used to index buyers, and t is used to index time periods
(year-month pairs). A similar econometric specification
is used for Equations (2) – (4). We take natural log
transformation for the following variables: number of
bids
(ln(num_bids)),
buyer
experience
(ln(experience+1)) and auction duration (ln(duration)),
considering that the distributions for these variables are

skewed. The log-transformation also allows percentage
interpretations of the model estimates.
𝑩𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑬𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚𝒊𝒋𝒒𝒕 = 𝛽5 + 𝛽7 ×
𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽D ×
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽J 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠C +
𝛿" + & 𝑡& ∗ 𝛼& + $ 𝑐$ ∗ 𝛾$ + 𝜀C$"&
(1)
𝑨𝒖𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒎𝒆𝒊𝒋𝒒𝒕 = 𝛽5 + 𝛽7 ×
𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽D ×
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛C$"& + 𝛽J 𝐴𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠C +
𝛿" + & 𝑡& ∗ 𝛼& + $ 𝑐$ ∗ 𝛾$ + 𝜀C$"&
(2)
Tables 5 and 6 report the main findings of the effects
of auction design variables on the number of bids and
bidder quality, respectively.
In Table 5, our main dependent variable of interest
is the number of bids. As Column (1) shows, not
surprisingly both auction duration and auction
description have a positive and significant effect on the
number of bids. Specifically, 10% increase in auction
duration (on average, 1 day) leads to 2.22% more bids,
and 10% increase in description length (on average, 10
words) leads to 3.58% more bids. Therefore, H1a and
H2a are both supported.
Table 5. Results for Auction Outcomes
(1)
ln(num_bids)
0.222***
(0.008)
ln(description)
0.358***
(0.008)
project budget
0.021***
(0.003)
2.project_category
0.016
(0.021)
3.project_category
0.358***
(0.016)
4.project_category
0.398***
(0.027)
Constant
1.011***
(0.059)
Observations
69,323
R-squared
0.170
Number of buyers
19,532
Buyer FE
Yes
Time Dummies
Yes
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
DVs:
ln(duration)

Table 6. Results for Contractor Quality
VARIABLES
ln(duration)
ln(description)
project budget

(1)

(2)

avg(win_rate)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.013***
(0.001)
-0.001***
(0.000)

avg(success_rate)
-0.025***
(0.001)
-0.036***
(0.001)
-0.005***
(0.000)
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2.project_category

0.008***
-0.039***
(0.002)
(0.004)
3.project_category
-0.017***
0.025***
(0.001)
(0.003)
4.project_category
-0.007**
-0.098***
(0.002)
(0.005)
Constant
0.127***
0.516***
(0.005)
(0.010)
Observations
69,323
69,323
R-squared
0.054
0.091
Number of buyers
19,532
19,532
Buyer FE
Yes
Yes
Time Dummies
Yes
Yes
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1

In Table 6, the dependent variables of interest are
measures of bidder quality, as defined and measured in
Table 3. Interestingly, we find consistent effects across
all measures. The estimations show that auctions with a
longer duration attract more low quality bidders, and
auctions with longer descriptions also attract more low
quality bidders. For example, as Column (1) shows,
10% increase (1 day) in auction duration reduces
average win rate by approximately 0.06%3, and 10%
increase (10 words) in auction description decreases
average success rate by 0.13%4. Altogether, these
findings provide empirical support that shorter duration
and shorter description influence bidder behaviors and
can help screen out inexperienced and less capable
bidders. In essence, H1b and H2b are both supported.

6.2. Bidder-level Empirical Analysis
In order to further explore how auction design
characteristics influence bidders’ bid choice, we
construct a list of active bidders and open projects on the
market for each day during our study period. We define
active bidders as those who at least bid for one project
at that day. We recover active bidders’ consideration
sets by narrowing down to the other projects that are in
the same category and submitted at a similar time as the
project(s) they bid. Assuming that bidders are rational
and make their optimal bid decision by evaluating those
open projects within their consideration sets based on
project characteristics, employer characteristics, etc.,
the econometric model at the bidder level is specified
as:
𝐏𝐫 (𝑩𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒊 _𝒃𝒊𝒅𝒔_𝒐𝒏_𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒋𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒋 ) = 𝛼 + 𝛽7 ×
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛽D ×𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ + 𝛽J ×𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ ×

𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦C& + 𝛽e ×𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛$ ×
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑟_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦C& + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠$ + 𝛿& + 𝜀C&

We limit our sample to bids that are submitted within
the first day for the following reasons. First, the bids
within the first day include most bids. There are on
average around 75% of bids submitted within the first
day for an open project. Second, since the average
bidder quality decreases as the auction progresses, our
estimated results based on the bid choice at the first day
serve as a conservative estimate. Third, by ruling out
those bids submitted in the later days, we avoid the
contamination of those bidders who make the bid
decision by herding, mimicking or learning from other
bidders’ bid decisions. Further, to show the robustness
of our result, we estimate our model with both the
Conditional Logit Model and Linear Probability Model
with bidders-day pair level fixed effects5 (Table 7).
Moreover, the result is consistent when we rerun the
analysis by including all the submitted bids into our
sample.
As Table 7 shows, the main effect of project
description and auction duration are significantly
positive. In other words, the longer project description
or the longer auction duration, the higher number of bids
the project will attract, which lends to support H1a and
H2a.
However, the interaction between project
description and the bidder’s win rate is significantly
negative. Moreover, the interaction between project
duration and the bidder’s success rate is also
significantly negative. As such, if bidders are of highquality, such as those who tend to have a high
probability to win the auction or those who usually
actually complete projects in time, they are less likely to
bid for projects with the longer description or longer
auction duration. In other words, bidders with a higher
win rate or success rate are less likely to bid for a project
with long auction description or auction duration. As
such, projects with long description or auction duration
tend to disproportionately attract low-quality bidders.
Therefore, both H1b and H2b are supported.
Table 7. Results for Bidders’ Auction Choices
(1)

3

If we increase project duration by 10%, avg(win_rate) decreases
0.006*0.1=0.06%.

(3)

(2)

(3)

4

If we increase project description by 10%, avg(success_rate)
decreases 0.013*0.1=0.13%
5 Estimation Results of Linear Probability Model are suppressed for
brevity.
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Model
DV
ln(description)
ln(duration)
project budget
sealed_bid
project_nonpublic
avg_rating_buyer
experience_buyer
buyer_gold_membership
buyer_ppp
ln(description)*seller_winrate
ln(duration)*seller_winrate

LPM

LPM
LPM
Daily_bid_dummy
0.001***
0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.000***
0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.001***
0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.002***
-0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.000***
-0.000*** -0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.000***
-0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.000
-0.000
-0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.000***
-0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.004***
(0.001)

ln(description)*
seller_success_rate
ln(duration)*seller_success_rate
month dummies
bidder-day pair fixed-effects
N

yes
yes
1,353,088

yes
yes
1,353,088

-0.001***
(0.000)
-0.001***
(0.000)
yes
yes
804,280

ln(duration)
project budget
sealed_bid
project_nonpublic
avg_rating_buyer
experience_buyer
buyer_gold_membership
buyer_ppp
ln(description)*seller_winrate
ln(duration)*seller_winrate

(4)
Logit

(5)
(6)
Logit
Logit
Daily_bid_dummy
0.121***
0.165*** 0.195***
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.020)
0.041***
0.073*** 0.118***
(0.010)
(0.012)
(0.022)
0.093***
0.092*** 0.116***
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.023)
-0.091**
-0.092**
-0.080*
(0.039)
(0.039)
(0.048)
-0.268*** -0.269*** -0.219***
(0.043)
(0.043)
(0.052)
-0.010*** -0.010***
-0.006*
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.003)
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.018
-0.017
-0.013
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.031)
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
-0.862***
(0.106)
-0.663***
(0.134)

ln(description)*
seller_success_rate

-0.214***

ln(duration)*seller_success_rate
month dummies
bidder-day pair fixed-effects
N

7.1. Discussion
This paper aims to investigate how auction design
parameters, namely auction duration and auction
description, affect auction outcomes and project
outcomes. Our research provides empirical evidence
regarding the strategic roles of auction duration and
auction description as a potential screening mechanism
for online labor matching platforms. Shorter duration
and shorter description help screen out less experienced
and capable bidders, and in turn lead to higher
contractor quality and greater likelihood of project
success. This research contributes to the literature by
showing how auction design can potentially serve as a
screening mechanism, and how they affect bidder
quality and auction outcomes. Our finding also helps
explain why many online labor matching platforms have
now placed a limit on auction duration.

7.2 Implications

(cont’d Table 7)
Model
DV
ln(description)

7. General Discussion

yes
yes
617,273

yes
yes
617,273

(0.036)
-0.171***
(0.041)
yes
yes
390,092

Note: a. Robust standard errors clustered by bidder-day pair are
reported in parentheses; b. p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The implications from our findings are offered as
follows. On the practical side, buyers of IT software
services interested in using the online labor matching
platform have to understand that their intuition may
work against expectations, as longer auction duration
and more detailed auction description, while receiving
more bids, may actually end up attracting more low
quality contractors and also lead to more contract
indecision and project incompletion. Apparently, each
auction for software projects is different and hence
requires unique auction design specifics, but in general,
buyers are advised to keep the duration and description
short to the extent possible. On the research side, auction
design is found to be more complex than one may think.
Our paper presents the evidence based on both the
project-level analysis and the bidder decision level
analysis and suggests that auction design parameters
like duration and description, as straightforward as they
look, deserve more in-depth analysis that may lead to
other interesting and perhaps even counter-intuitive
findings.

7.3 Limitations
As with all observational research, our study is not
free of limitations. One limitation of this study is that
the auction design parameters examined here are
choices of the buyers, so these auction design
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parameters potentially suffer from a selection effect. In
this paper, we have controlled for project characteristics
such as project category and project budget, and hence
the selection effect related to unobserved buyer choice
of design parameter is not serious. However, future
research could seek to randomize such design features
with field experimentations in these markets. Besides,
to ensure similarity across projects, double postings may
be needed and hence impose additional challenges.

7.4 Conclusion
In this study, we assess the effects of two auction
design parameters, namely duration and description, on
auction outcomes (i.e., number of bids and bidder
quality) and project outcomes (i.e., project being
contracted and being completed). Our empirical results
reveal that auctions with longer duration and longer
description receive more bids, but they also attract more
low-quality contractors with lower win rate and lower
completion rate. Our findings suggest that auction
duration and auction description can be employed as a
potential screening mechanism for bidder quality on the
online labor matching platforms. Overall, our study
makes a contribution to the related literature by
providing new insights into the effective design of
auctions on these platforms. Implications are also drawn
from our findings for both practice and research.
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